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Abstract: 
 
We construct and estimate a structural principal/agent model of contract 
renegotiation in the French urban transport sector in a context where operators 
are privately informed on their innate costs (adverse selection) and can exert 
cost-reducing managerial effort (moral hazard). This model captures two 
important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in 
practice by local public authorities to regulate the service: cost-plus and fixed-
price contracts with positive subsidies. Second, these subsidies increase over 
time. Such increasing subsidies are consistent with the theoretical hypothesis 
that principals cannot commit not to renegotiate and contracts are renegotiation-
proof. We compare this situation to the hypothetical case with full commitment. 
The distribution of innate costs of operators is shifted upwards under this 
hypothetical scenario. The welfare gains of commitment are significant and 
accrue mostly to operators. Estimates of the weights that local governments 
give to the operator´s profit in their objective functions and of the social value of 
the cost-reducing managerial effort are obtained as by-products. 
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1 Introduction
Real world contractual relationships are ongoing processes in changing environments.
Parties lay down arrangements for trading goods and services covering several periods.
However they often recontract as new information on market demand and costs struc-
ture becomes available. Although economic theory has devoted considerable attention
to understanding dynamic contractual relationships and especially how contracts may be
renegotiated over time, the empirical literature on those issues lags much behind both
in terms of volume and scope. This gap is a real concern both for theorists who may
need empirical evidence to target their e¤ort towards sensible issues but also for applied
economists who might be de facto missing the theoretical models that could be amenable
to empirical analysis.
The main lessons of the theoretical literature is that renegotiation matters for con-
tract design. Renegotiation has a positive impact because it improves contracting ex post.
However, once those e¢ ciency gains are anticipated, renegotiation has also perverse e¤ects
on contractual partiesex ante incentives: information may be incorporated in contract
design only at a slow pace;1 the threat of regulatory hold-up may impede specic invest-
ments which requires costly governance and safeguards arrangements;2 and nally optimal
risk-sharing arrangements may be disrupted.3 Overall, renegotiation imposes transaction
costs on ex ante contracting. Those costs prevent from achieving the informationally con-
strained e¢ cient solution that could have been reached if the parties had bind themselves
to a long-term contract. An open issue from an empirical viewpoint is to assess the welfare
losses associated with a limited commitment. Beyond, another important question is also
to understand how those losses are distributed between contracting parties.
Answering those questions is crucial both for researchers to ascertain the relevance of
a whole body of theoretical literature on renegotiation, but also for practitioners who may
want to evaluate the performances of real-world contractual practices. In this respect, the
French urban transportation sector o¤ers a particularly attractive eld for study. Moti-
vated by a concern towards improving ex ante competition among potential operators, the
1See the seminal paper by Dewatripont (1989) and the literature on adverse-selection under imperfect
commitment (Hart and Tirole, 1988, La¤ont and Tirole, 1993, Chapter 10, among others). La¤ont and
Martimort (2002, Chapter 9) provide some entries.
2Williamson (1985).
3Fudenberg and Tirole (1990).
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1993 Law on Transportation imposed that franchise contracts must be re-auctioned and
re-negotiated every 5 years by public authorities in charge of regulating the service.
Since then, practitioners in the industry have repeatedly complained that this institu-
tional constraint on contract length is too tight. Expectations that welfare gains could be
achieved by increasing contract duration is at the source of an ongoing political debate
and some political activism by operators.
Motivation. This paper has two main objectives. First, we construct and estimate a
structural principal/agent model of contract renegotiation in the French urban transport
sector. A basic assumption of this model is that contracting takes place under asym-
metric information: operators are privately informed on their innate costs at the time of
contracting with public authorities. Second, we use those estimates to recover not only
the welfare gains but also their distribution if full commitment were feasible. These gains
are signicant although unevenly distributed: operators are net winners when the length
of the contract is extended whereas taxpayers/consumers lose.
Our model accounts for two important features of the industry. First, only two kinds
of contracts are used in practice by local public authorities (principals) to regulate the
service: cost-plus and xed-price contracts. It is well-known from the works of La¤ont and
Tirole (1993, Chapter 1), Rogerson (1987), Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992)
and Mookherjee and Reichelstein (2001) that such menus of linear contracts have strong
incentive properties under asymmetric information. Menus facilitate self-selection of oper-
ators according to their private information on innate costs. In addition, linear contracts
have also nice robustness properties under cost uncertainty.4 More importantly, from an
implementation viewpoint, menus approximate quite well, and are even sometimes able to
achieve what more complex nonlinear contracts would do.5 Rogerson (2003) argued that,
in most real-world procurement contexts, a simple two-item menu (cost-plus/xed-price)
may su¢ ce to achieve much of the gains from trade, even under asymmetric information.6
4La¤ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 1, p.109) and Caillaud, Guesnerie and Rey (1992).
5La¤ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 1) showed that the optimal nonlinear cost reimbursement rule can
be implemented with a menu of linear contracts when this rule is convex. Wilson (1993) and McAfee
(2002) demonstrated that such menus might only contains a few items.
6More specically, Rogerson (2003) supposed that the rms innate cost which is its private information
is uniformly distributed and shows that this simple menu can secure three fourth of the surplus that an
optimal contract would achieve. Chu and Sappington (2007) challenged this result beyond the case of a
uniform distribution. On a related note, Bower (1993), Gasmi, La¤ont and Sharkey (1999), Schmalensee
(1989) and Reichelstein (1992) investigated the value of relying on a single linear contract and concluded
also on the good welfare performances achieved with such rough contract design.
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A second important feature of the urban transportation sector is that subsidies (or
compensationsas they are often called by practitioners) paid to operators increase over
time no matter the characteristics of the service. Our theoretical model provides a ratio-
nale for such patterns as resulting from the limited ability of local authorities to commit
and the fact that, as time goes on, the operators cost structure gets better known. This
argument is already familiar from the agency literature on limited commitment.7 We
revisit this insight in an institutional context where two-item menus are the only feasible
incentive mechanisms. Whereas the existing theoretical literature on limited commitment
has focused on discrete types models, derived fully optimal renegotiation-proof contracts
but is often criticized for its lack of tractability, our model below imports much of the
tractability of Rogersons model into a framework where contracts are renegotiated over
time.8 In doing so, we look for a theoretical modeling that is consistent with our data
set. In particular, considering a continuum of types is a prerequisite to evaluate a mean-
ingful distribution of cost parameters in our empirical model. This allows us to neatly
characterize the probabilities of various contractual regimes (cost-plus, xed-price, and
changes over time between those two options). This is an important preliminary step of
our estimation procedure based on a maximum likelihood criterion.
Empirical analysis. Turning more specically to the empirical part of our study, we
consider the two scenarios of full and limited commitment with renegotiation and estimate
structural parameters of the model under each hypothesis. To understand the estimation
bias that arises when wrongly assuming full commitment, it is useful to come back on the
basic intuition behind the trade-o¤ between ex post e¢ ciency and ex ante incentives that
appears under renegotiation. Roughly speaking, since renegotiation raises subsidies in
later periods of contracting, even less e¢ cient operators may choose xed-price contracts
at the renegotiation stage. Even though this also yields e¢ ciency gains, renegotiation
increases informational rents for the most e¢ cient operators which makes them less eager
to reveal their types earlier. From the public authorities viewpoint, renegotiation is
found more attractive ex post when the operators information rent has a lower weight in
the public authoritiesobjective functions and when the social value of managerial e¤ort
is greater so that the e¢ ciency gains from renegotiation dominate its costs in terms of
7Dewatripont (1989), La¤ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 10), and La¤ont and Martimort (2002, Chap-
ter 9) among others.
8Rogersons analysis is static and cannot by denition describe the rich dynamic patterns observed in
our data set, in particular the steady increase in subsidies over time and the move towards xed-price
contracts as time goes on.
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extra information rents left to operators. Neglecting the possibility of renegotiation and
wrongly assuming that a full commitment regime prevails amounts thus to underestimate
the social value of managerial e¤ort, giving to the operatorsinformation rent a greater
weight in the public authoritiesobjective functions and, nally, introducing biases in the
estimation of the distribution of innate costs that tend to overestimate information rents.
Estimating this distribution for the set of operators in our data set under either a full
commitment or a renegotiation scenario, we nd that operators are slightly more e¢ cient
before undertaking any cost-reducing activities when assuming renegotiation. Finally, a
last result of our estimation is that operators provide on average less managerial e¤ort in
that scenario.
From our empirical analysis, we estimate also the weight of the operators prot in
the public authoritys objective function. This weight depends on the political color
of the public authority. In particular, right-wing principals are more prone to give up
information rents to operators.
Finally, using our estimates of the operators innate cost distributions and other para-
meters of the model, we evaluate the welfare gains that would be obtained when moving
to the full commitment solution. The intertemporal subsidies under full commitment are
higher than under renegotiation, so that taxpayers are the net losers from a hypothetical
increase in the duration of contracts. However, the overall welfare gains are signicant.
Taxpayers bear an increase in tax burden of 3.8 per cent whereas operators see their ex-
pected information rent increase by roughly 12.2 per cent. This result clearly explains the
operatorspolitical activism in pushing for reforms that would increase contracts length.
Literature review. Our model borrows on the recent empirical literature on contracts and
regulation. First, as already explained, we contribute to the ongoing empirical debate
on whether complex menus of contracts are actually implemented in practice, or, on the
contrary, regulators use menus with a reduced number of items. In a pioneering paper,
Wolak (1994) estimated the production function of a Californian water utility, and argues
that regulatory mechanisms à la Baron and Myerson (1982) are used. Assuming instead
cost observability as in La¤ont and Tirole (1993), Gasmi, La¤ont and Sharkey (1997),
Brocas, Chan and Perrigne (2006) and Perrigne and Vuong (2007) considered complex
regulatory schemes to estimate costs and demand parameters of structural regulatory
models. Other empirical studies argue instead that principals do not use such complex
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mechanisms. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) focused on the private construction industry in
the U.S. and argue that most contracts are either cost-plus or xed-price. The reason for
such restricted menu is that public authorities look for an appropriate trade-o¤ between
providing ex ante incentives with xed-price contracts and avoiding ex post transaction
costs due to costly renegotiation with cost-plus arrangements. Considering contracts in
the automobile insurance industry, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) restricted the analysis
to simple menus with two types of coverage. In the eld of transportation, Gagnepain and
Ivaldi (2002) focused on the incentive e¤ects of cost-plus and xed-price contracts. They
measured actual welfare related to real regulatory practices, and compared this measure
to what could be achieved if more complex second-best mechanisms were implemented.
The present paper improves signicantly upon Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) by explicitly
modeling contract design by public authorities and giving more attention to the dynamic
choice of contracts by operators.
A second feature of our empirical model is related to the dynamic nature of the con-
tractual relationship between the principal and the agent. Dionne and Doherty (1994)
focused on the car insurance industry in California and suggested that insurers may use
long-term contracts as a device to enhance e¢ ciency and attract portfolios of dominantly
low-risk drivers. We illustrate here how long-term contracts may benet both to public
authorities and transport operators.
Finally, our analysis assumes that local public authorities may be tempted to favor
private interests when designing contracts. The political color of the local government
inuences the distribution of welfare among the di¤erent actors involved in their provision.
Empirical tests on capture and ideology in politics are given in Kalt and Zupan (1984,
1990). Those papers provided evidence on the fact that policymakersideology may have
a signicant impact on regulatory outcome, in a way that is similar to what happens in
the French transportation sector.
Section 2 gives an overview of the French urban transportation industry. Section
3 presents our theoretical model and solves for the optimal menu of contracts (xed-
prices/cost-plus) both under full commitment and renegotiation. We derive in particular
the important property that subsidies increase over time under a renegotiation-proof sce-
nario. Section 4 develops our empirical method. Section 5 evaluates the magnitude of the
welfare gains when moving to full commitment but also the distribution of those gains
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between operators and taxpayers. Section 6 concludes by highlighting a few alleys for
further research. Proofs of the theoretical model are developed in an Appendix.
2 The French Urban Transportation Industry
As in most countries around the world, urban transportation in France is a regulated
activity. Local transportation networks cover each urban area of signicant size. For each
network, a local authority (a city, a group of cities or a district) contracts with a single
operator to provide the service. Regulatory rules prevent the presence of several suppliers
of transportation services on the same urban network. A distinguishing feature of France
compared to most other OECD countries is that about eighty percent of local operators
are private and are owned by three large companies, two of them being private while the
third one is semi-public.9 These companies, with their respective type of ownership and
market share (in terms of number of networks operated) are in 2002: KEOLIS (private,
30%), TRANSDEV (semi-public, 19%), CONNEX (private, 25%). In addition there are
a small private group, AGIR, and a few public rms under local government control.
2.1 Economic Environment
The 1982 French Law was enacted to facilitate decentralized decision-making on urban
transportation and to provide a guide for regulation. As a result, each local authority
organizes now its own transportation system by setting the route structure, the capacity
level, the quality of service, the fare structure, the conditions for subsidizing the service,
the level of investment and the nature of ownership. The local authority may operate
the network directly or it may delegate that task to an operator. In this case, a formal
contract denes the regulatory rules that the operator must follow as well as the cost-
reimbursement rule between the public authority and the operator.
Since 1993, beauty contests are required to allocate the building and management
of new infrastructures for urban transportation when the renewal of contracts comes to
an end. In practice, however, very few networks change operators from one regulatory
period to the other. Documentary investigation sheds light on the fact that awarding
9For an overview of the regulation of urban transit systems in the di¤erent countries of the European
Union, in the United States and Japan, see IDEI (1999).
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transport operations through tenders does not necessarily guarantee ex ante competition
since local transport authorities usually receive bids from one single candidate, namely
the operator already in place. Several reasons potentially explain this phenomenon. First,
local authorities are either reluctant to really implement the law or do not have enough
expertise to launch complex calls for tenders. Second, the three groups owning most
of the urban transport operators in France are usually located on specic geographical
areas. This restricts competition in awarding transport operations in urban areas where
regulatory contracts come to an end. These groups also operate other municipal services
such as water distribution or garbage collection, which makes it even harder for the
regulator to credibly punish the operator in case of bad performance.
In most urban areas, operating costs are twice as high as commercial revenues on
average. Budgets are rarely balanced without subsidies. One reason is that operators
face universal service obligations and may have to operate in low demand areas. Prices
are maintained at a low level in order to ensure a¤ordable access to all consumers of public
transportation. Moreover, special fares are provided to targeted groups like pensioners
and students. Subsidies are taken from the States budget, the local authoritys budget,
and a special tax paid by any local rm (employing more than nine full-time workers).
In addition to the price distortions causing decits, informational asymmetries that a¤ect
the cost side make it more di¢ cult to resume these decits. This aspect is discussed in
more details in the sequel.
Performing a welfare analysis of regulatory schemes requires a database that encom-
passes both the performance and the organization of the French urban transport industry.
The basic idea is to consider each system in an urban area during a time period as a re-
alization of a regulatory contract. Such a database has been created in the early 1980s.
It results from an annual survey conducted by the Centre dEtude et de Recherche du
Transport Urbain (CERTU, Lyon) with the support of the Groupement des Autorités
Responsables du Transport (GART, Paris), a nationwide trade organization that gathers
most of the local authorities in charge of a urban transport network. This rich source is
probably unique in France as a tool of comparing regulatory systems both across space
and over time. For our study, we have selected all urban areas of more than 100,000 in-
habitants for homogeneity purposes. Indeed, smaller cities may entail service and network
characteristics that di¤er signicantly from those in bigger urban areas. Discarding these
smaller cities allows us to identify in a more satisfactory manner di¤erences in ine¢ cien-
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cies and cost-reducing activities across operators. Note that the sample does not include
the largest networks of France, i.e., Paris, Lyon and Marseille, as they are not covered by
the survey. Overall, the panel data set covers 49 di¤erent urban transport networks over
the period 1987-2001.Note nally that we focus only on transport networks where the op-
erator is not public. This rules out the so-called Regies where the service is provided by a
public entity (this is mostly the case in large cities such as Paris, Lyon and Marseille). We
may indeed expect that those cases are less concerned with the principal-agent problem
at the heart of our investigation.
We assume that the network operator has both private information about its innate
technology (adverse selection) and that its cost-reducing e¤ort is non-observable (moral
hazard). Because French local authorities exercise their new powers on transportation
policy since the enactment of the 1982 Law only, and since they usually face serious -
nancial di¢ culties, their limited auditing capacities is recognized among practitioners. A
powerful and well-performed audit system needs e¤ort, time and money. French experts
on urban transportation blame local authorities for being too lax in assessing operating
costs, mainly because of a lack of knowledge of the technology. The number of buses
required for a specic network, the costs incurred on each route, the fuel consumption
of buses (which is highly dependent on driversskills), the driversbehavior toward cus-
tomers, the e¤ect of tra¢ c congestion on costs, are all aspects for which operators have
much more data and a better understanding than public authorities. This suggests the
presence of adverse selection on innate technology in the rst place. Given the techni-
cal complexity of these issues, it should be even harder for the local authority to assess
whether and to what extent operators undertake e¤orts to provide appropriate and ef-
cient management. Moral hazard issues arise on top of the adverse selection problem.
When compounded, those informational asymmetries play a crucial role in the design of
contractual arrangements and nancial objectives.
Before turning to the description of the contracts, two additional remarks are worth
being stressed. First, private information on demand is not a relevant issue in our industry.
Local governments are well-informed about the transportation needs of citizens. The
number of trips performed over a certain period are easily observed, and the regulator has
a very precise idea of how the socio-demographic characteristics of a urban area uctuate
over time. Given the level of demand, the regulator sets the service capacity provided
by the operator. Second, we do not address the issue of determining what should be the
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good rate-of-return on capital. The rolling stock is owned by the local government in a
majority of networks. In this case, the regulator is responsible for renewing the vehicles,
as well as guaranteeing a certain level of capital quality.
2.2 Regulatory Contracts
Table 1 sheds light on several features of the regulatory contracts, which are worth empha-
sizing. As already mentioned, two types of regulatory contracts are implemented in the
French urban transport industry. Over the period of observation, xed-price contracts are
employed in 55.5% of the cases. Fixed-price regimes are high-powered incentive schemes,
while cost-plus regimes do not provide any incentives for cost reduction.
An important characteristic of the industry is related to the evolution of subsidies over
time. The volume of service supplied rises over our period of observation. Operating costs
are expected to increase proportionally (or less than proportionally if economies of scale
are found to be signicant). Once having corrected for the increase of input prices over
time, it appears that the average subsidies (per unit of supply, i.e., per seat-kilometer)
paid to the operators increase in a signicant share of networks. Figure 1 illustrates this
pattern for a sample of 10 urban areas.
On average, contracts are signed for a period of 5 to 6 years, which allows us to observe
in most cases several regulatory arrangements for the same network. Overall, we observe
136 di¤erent contracts. We observe the contract from its starting point for 94 cases. In
the same network, the regulatory scheme may switch from cost-plus to xed-price or from
xed-price to cost-plus between two regulatory periods. We thus observe 20 changes of
regulatory regimes, most of them (i.e., 17) being switches from cost-plus to xed-price
regimes. These changes occur because the same local authority may be willing to change
regulatory rules, or because a new government is elected and changes the established rules.
Note however that the arrival of a new government does not imply an early renegotiation
of the contract before its term. New local governments are committed to the contracts
signed by the former authority. We detect 22 changes of local governments in our database.
Finally, as already suggested, very few changes of operators are observed over our
period of observation: Only 2 new operators proposed services between 1987 and 2001.
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3 Theoretical Model
Our theoretical model takes into account the various features of the French urban trans-
port industry stressed above and adapts the lessons of the contracting literature under
imperfect commitment to t with those empirical features. First, in our regulatory frame-
work, service providers have the choice between either a xed-price or a cost-plus contract.
Second, contracts may evolve over time with increasing subsidies. We will argue below
that such patterns arise when subsidies are renegotiation-proof. This positive model
is then compared to an hypothetical setting where regulators could commit and optimal
subsidies remain constant over time.
Consider a local authority (sometimes referred to as the principal in the sequel).
Generalizing the objective functions used respectively in Baron and Myerson (1982) and
La¤ont and Tirole (1993), the preferences of this principal are dened as:
W = S   (1 + )t(C) + U where  < 1 +  and  > 0:
The gross surplus generated by the service S is supposed to be xed. Implicitly, we
consider a setting where the elasticity of demand is very small which seems a reasonable
assumption in the case of transportation.10 The payment o¤ered by the local government
to the rm (sometimes referred to as the agent in the sequel) depends on whether
xed-price or cost-plus contracts are used. For a xed-price contract, the principal o¤ers
a xed payment t(C)  b for any realized cost C. With a cost-plus contract, the principal
reimburses the cost C incurred by the rm and t(C)  C for all C. Raising subsidies
from the local governments general budget with distortionary taxation entails some dead-
weight loss that is captured by introducing a cost of public funds  > 0.11
Local public authorities di¤er in terms of the weights they give to the operators prot
U in their objective functions. To have a meaningful trade-o¤between the dual objectives
of extracting the contractors information rent and inducing e¢ cient cost-reducing e¤ort,
we assume that  < 1 +  so that, overall, one extra euro left to the rm is socially
costly. Various motivations can be found for such modeling of the preferences of local
governments. For instance, the parameter  might capture the rms bargaining power
10Oum et al. (1992).
11The estimate for developed countries is close to  = 0:3 (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley, 1985, and
Hausman and Poterba, 1987). Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) obtain a similar result in their study of the
French transportation sector.
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at the time of awarding franchises and reect ex ante competition on these markets.12 ; 13
In view of our empirical study, we have to distinguish local governments according
to their political inclination, which corresponds to di¤erent weights left to the private
operator in their objective functions. We assume that  =  (resp.  =  < ) for a
rightist (resp. leftist) local government since it is certainly eager to defend (resp. to ght)
the private rms owners.14
Turning now to the cost structure, we follow La¤ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 1) and
Rogerson (2003) in considering that the observable cost of one unit of the service C blends
together an adverse selection component  related to the innate e¢ ciency of the service
and a cost-reducing managerial e¤ort e. We postulate the following functional form:
C =    e:
E¤ort is costly to provide for the rms management and the corresponding non-monetary
disutility function  (e) is increasing and convex ( 0 > 0;  00 > 0) with  (0) = 0. The
intrinsic e¢ ciency parameter  is drawn once for all before contracting from the interval
[; ] according to the common knowledge cumulative distribution F () which has an
everywhere positive and atomless density f(). Following the screening literature, we
assume that the monotone hazard rate property holds, d
d
(R()) > 0 where R() = F ()
f()
so that all optimization problems considered below are quasi-concave.15
With those notations in hand, we may as well write the rms prot as:
U = t(C)  C    (e)
where t(C) is the payment received from the public authority.
12In this sector, Ex ante competition is not so erce. Indeed, di¤erent operators avoid head-to-head
competition and generally make tenders for markets in distinct urban areas. The decision n0 05-D-
38 of the French Conseil de la Concurrence shows that competition authorities are well-aware of this
downstream collusion between potential operators. In more than 60 % of cases, there is indeed only a
single bidder. This potential horizontal collusion is captured in ad hoc way in our framework through the
parameter . The benet of such ad hoc specication of the intensity of potential downstream competition
is to t real-world practices while it fortunately eases the analysis of the contractual dynamics.
13Following the insights of Baron (1989), La¤ont (1996) and Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003),
these preferences might also result from the ght of various political forces within the local public au-
thority.
14La¤ont (1996) developed related political economy models of regulation relying on such arguments.
15It is worth noticing for the sake of our empirical analysis that the same operator could have di¤erent
realizations of the innate cost parameter on two di¤erent markets. This assumption captures the fact
that costs of a particular network are to a large extent idiosyncratic.
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3.1 Full Commitment
In this section, we assume that the local government o¤ers to the operator a long-term
contract which covers two contracting periods. The public authority has all bargaining
power at the contracting stage when doing so. The principal can commit himself to any
pattern of subsidies and cost reimbursement rules over time. Of course, this ability to
commit allows to reach the highest possible intertemporal welfare. This gives us an attrac-
tive benchmark against which to assess the alternative model under limited commitment
and renegotiation. This benchmark is also useful when we move to our empirical analysis
and evaluate the costs of renegotiation.
Let  be the discount factor and let us normalize the length of the rst-period ac-
counting period with the weight  = 1
1+
.
Consider rst the case of a long-term xed-price contract. Such a contract entails sub-
sidies (b1; b2) over both periods. With a xed-price contract, the principal is able to pass
onto the rms management all incentives to save on costs. Let e be the corresponding
rst-best e¤ort such that  0(e) = 1, and denote by k = e  (e) its social value.16 Such
a long-term contract yields to the rm the (normalized) intertemporal payo¤
b1 + (1  )b2    + k:
Instead, with a long term cost-plus contract, the rms manager exerts no e¤ort and
the rms payo¤ is zero.17
Only the most e¢ cient operators such that    choose xed-price contracts. By
incentive compatibility, if any given type prefers a xed-price contract, it must be that
all types which are more e¢ cient does so also. The types space is thus split between
two subsets: those e¢ cient operators taking the xed-price and those ine¢ cient ones
taking the cost-plus long-term contracts. The corresponding cut-o¤  corresponds to an
operator being just indi¤erent between the long-term cost-plus and xed-price contracts:
 = b1 + (1  )b2 + k:
16This parameter is by construction related to the rms internal organization and incentive structure.
Any agency costs coming from the separation of ownership and control between the rms management
and shareholders is encapsulated into the  () function.
17The operator is not responsible for improving the quality of the service since the latter is set by the
local authority and focuses on cost-reducing e¤ort only. Quality entails various dimensions of the public
transit operations such as the size of the network, the number and size of lines, the number of stops, the
frequency of the service, and the age of the rolling stock.
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In particular, the most e¢ cient operators such that    earns an information rent,
   .
Remark 1 Note that the operators choice between taking either a long-term xed price
contract or a cost-plus one reveals information on the operators type. After this choice
becomes publicly known, the public authority can assess whether that type is above the
threshold  or not. Under full commitment, that information revelation takes place in
one stage only and the public authority is not going to use that information to rene his
contractual o¤ers in the future.
Remark 2 It is worth stressing also that, although the public authority o¤ers a menu of
long-term contracts, the actual choice made by the operator selects only one item within
the menu. In view of our empirical study, we only observe the resulting choice made by
operators not the negotiation process that leads to this choice. This process is captured,
in the pure mechanism design tradition, by having principals o¤ering rst menus among
which agents self-select.
Given those remarks, the principals intertemporal expected welfare under full com-
mitment can be expressed as:
W F (b1; b2) = S (1+)
 
(b1 + (1  )b2)F (b1 + (1  )b2 + k) +
Z 
b1+(1 )b2+k
f()d
!
+
Z b1+(1 )b2+k

(b1 + (1  )b2 + k   )f()d:
The term (b1 + (1   )b2)F (b1 + (1   )b2 + k) represents the expected subsidy un-
der a long-term xed-price contract. The term
R 
b1+(1 )b2+k f()d is meant for the
expected payment under a cost-plus contract. Finally, the last term represents the ex-
pected information rent which is left only to the most e¢ cient rms under the xed-price
contract.
Optimization of this objective function yields the values of the optimal subsidies under
full commitment.
Proposition 1 Under full commitment, the optimal xed-price contract is the twice-
repeated version of the static optimal xed-price contract. It entails a subsidy bF which is
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constant over time bF1 = b
F
2 = b
F and satises:
k =

1  
1 + 

R(bF + k): (1)
Only the most e¢ cient rms with types   F = bF + k take this long-term xed-price
contract. The least e¢ cient rms with types   F = bF + k take a long-term cost-plus
contract.
The result that, under full commitment, the optimal contract is the twice replica of
the optimal static contract is by now standard in the dynamic contracting literature.18
In particular, given that the economic environment is stationary, there is no chance of
moving from a cost-plus to a xed-price contract over time. This explains why we initially
focused on the dichotomic choice between either a long-term xed-price and a long-term
cost-plus contract and do not consider dynamic patterns with cost-plus contracts followed
by xed-prices. Such are certainly suboptimal under full commitment although, as we
will see, they play a signicant role under limited commitment.
The optimal menu of contracts trades o¤ e¢ ciency and rent extraction. O¤ering a
xed-price with a su¢ ciently large subsidy to all types would indeed ensure that the
operator exerts the rst-best e¤ort whatever its innate technology. However, doing so
also leaves too much information rent to the operator and this is socially costly. O¤er-
ing instead a cost-plus contract to all types nullies this rent while it also destroys any
incentives to exert e¤ort.
The intuition behind condition (1) is as follows. Suppose that the principal o¤ers a
xed subsidy b in both period. By raising this subsidy by db, the principal makes it sure
that with probability f(b+ k)db, the rm with type in the interval [b+ k; b+ k + db] will
now exert e¤ort e which generates an expected social benet (1+)kf(b+ k)db. On the
other hand, raising the subsidy entails a budgetary cost worth (1 + )F (b + k)db since
even rms with infra-marginal types will enjoy such an increase. This nevertheless also
raises the social value of the rent left to the most e¢ cient rms by a quantity F (b+k)db.
Finally, an optimal subsidy bF trades o¤ the expected e¢ ciency gains with the net cost
of increasing the rms rent. bF must balance those two e¤ects and solve:
(1 + )kf(bF + k)db+ F (bF + k)db = (1 + )F (bF + k)db:
18Baron and Besanko (1984) and La¤ont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 8) for similar results in more
general environments.
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Simplifying yields (1).
It is straightforward to check that increasing k or  increases the optimal subsidy bF .
Intuitively, when the rms e¤ort is more socially valuable or when its rent is found more
valuable by the public authority, the optimal subsidy under a xed-price contract should
be raised to induce higher powered incentives and command more rent.19
3.2 Renegotiation
Overview and modeling choices: The full commitment assumption used in Section 3.1
turns out to be excessive in view of real-world practices and as explained above. Although
the 1993 Law invites local authorities to re-auction the concession for a xed period of
5 years, these authorities are either reluctant to really implement the law or do not
have enough expertise to launch complex calls for tenders. In practice, local authorities
consider the requirement of re-auctioning the contract at xed dates as the opportunity
to renegotiate a contract with the incumbent (the so-called historical operator") instead
of really envisioning the possibility to contract with a new operator.
Theoretical studies to date have distinguished between two kinds of paradigms when it
comes to model intertemporal contracting under limited commitment. The rst concept
is that of long-term contracting with contracts which can be renegotiated if parties nd
it attractive to do so.20 The second paradigm considers short-term contracting where
parties cannot write any binding agreement for future rounds of contracting and only
spot contracts for the current period can be enforced.21 Although contracts in the French
transportation sector have a limited duration, the second of these paradigms does not cap-
ture the kind of relational contracting that characterizes a long-lived relationship between
a local authority and its historical operator·. The rst paradigm better ts evidence, al-
though it must be adapted to take into account that, even though a long-term contract
cannot be signed in practice, the promise of having a future round of contracting between
the public authority and the incumbent is su¢ ciently credible. In other words, although
19An interesting question is to investigate the welfare loss that the principal incurs by o¤ering just
a menu with only two items in a full commitment environment. This question is particular important
for practitioners. Using our estimates of the full commitment solutions, we address that question in a
companion paper (Gagnepain, Ivaldi and Martimort, 2009).
20Dewatripont (1989), La¤ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 10), Hart and Tirole (1988) and Rey and
Salanié (1990) in adverse selection contexts.
21Guesnerie, Freixas and Tirole (1985) and La¤ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 9) among others.
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no long-term contracts really bind parties together, everything happens as if those par-
ties credibly commit to promises for further rounds of contracting. The renegotiation
paradigm can then be replaced by a re-negotiationview of contracting that, although
technically similar, captures somewhat di¤erent real-world practices.
As soon as the local authority su¤ers from imperfect information on the operators
type, the selection of a contract within the simple two-item menu at the early contracting
stage reveals some information on the rms type. The choice of a xed-price contract is
interpreted by the principal as being good newssince it signals that the rms type is
below some cut-o¤. Instead, the choice of cost-plus contracts brings rather bad news.
In a dynamic environment, information on the cost structure is revealed over time and
the principal would like to draft new agreements that incorporated this new knowledge.
In particular, an increase over time in the subsidies under xed-price contracts allows
operators that have revealed themselves as being not very e¢ cient earlier on to achieve
productivity gains later on. Such increases in subsidies might thus be viewed as ex post
attractive from the principals viewpoint. However, the major lesson of the renegotiation
literature is that these ex post e¢ ciency gains also come with ex ante costs in delaying
information revelation so that, overall, renegotiation is costly from the principals view-
point. Some of the most e¢ cient rms may indeed prefer adopting cost-plus contracts
earlier on to enjoy the greater subsidies that future xed-price contracts will bring later
on. This important dynamic trade-o¤ and its impact on information revelation are at the
core of our model.
Timing: To describe more carefully the dynamics of the relationship between the prin-
cipal and the operator, let us make more explicit the timing of the contracting game that
is considered below:
 Date 0: The rm learns its e¢ ciency parameter .
 Date 0.25: The principal commits to a menu of subsidies (b1; b2) that would be given
under a long-term xed-price contracts.
 Date 0.50: The rm chooses whether to operate under such long-term xed-price
contract or not. The principal updates his beliefs on the rms innate cost following
that choice.
 Date 1.00: First-period costs are realized and payments are made accordingly.
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 Date 1.25: If he wishes so, the principal makes a renegotiated o¤er corresponding to
a new subsidy ~b2 under a xed-price contract that runs for the second period only.
 Date 1.50: The rm chooses whether to accept this new o¤er or not and chooses
his second-period e¤ort accordingly. If the o¤er is refused, the old contract be it
xed-price or cost-plus is enforced.
 Date 2: Second-period costs are realized and payments are made.
Equilibrium notion: An almost perfect Bayesian equilibrium (in short equilibrium) of
the contractual game consists of the following strategies and beliefs:
 Principals strategy: The principal o¤ers the prole of subsidies if the rm operates
under a long-term xed-price contracts (b1; b2) at date 1, and a renegotiated o¤er ~b2 which
might supersede b2 at date 2. This second-period o¤er is made after the principal has
updated his beliefs over the rms type parameter following its rst-period decision to
operate under the subsidies prole (b1; b2) or not.
 Agents strategy: The rm follows a cut-o¤ strategy and accepts to work on a prole
of subsidies (b1; b2) if and only if it is su¢ ciently e¢ cient, i.e.,  2 1 = [; 1]. A rm
with an intermediary type in the interval 2 = [

1; 

2] (where 

2  1) refuses this prole
in the rst period but accepts to work on a xed-price contract for the second period if
the subsidy is renegotiated towards a level ~b2 which is large enough. Such a rm moves
thus from a cost-plus to a xed-price contract over time. Finally, a rm being su¢ ciently
ine¢ cient, i.e.,   2, sticks on cost-plus contracts in both periods.
Remark 3 Almost equilibrium and limited updating: It is important to stress
that the principal takes into account only the updated beliefs that he has at date 0.50 when
making a renegotiated o¤er. This is a slight departure of full rationality to the extent that
the principal should have updated beliefs with the more precise information obtained by
observing rst-period costs under a cost-plus contract. This departure of full rationality
justies the use of the qualier almost for our notion of equilibrium.
Suppose instead that the principal was fully rational and would update beliefs for all re-
alizations of that rst-period cost. Ine¢ cient rms under a rst-period cost-plus contract
would certainly not reveal their type in the rst-period and, anticipating future renegotia-
tion of the contract, might claim having the worst possible rst-period cost C1 = . This
18
strategy increases the rms information rent for the rst period and it also hides valuable
information away from a fully rational principal in view of the second-period contracting.
If real-world practices were in lines with such strategy, one would observe mass points of
observations for cost-plus contracts. This certainly contradicts our data set where no such
masses in realized costs under cost-plus contracts are found.
Suppose instead that an ine¢ cient rm was to adopt a more naive rst-period behavior
and reveal its type not anticipating the principals latter use of that information. Such fully
rational principal would just learn the rms type C1 =  by observing and reimbursing the
realized rst-period cost. Then, for the second period, that principal would recommend to
that operator to work at cost C2 =  e and would compensate the rm for incurring that
rst-best e¤ort. This is clearly a naive strategy for the rm because hiding information
early on may induce the principal to increase subsidies at the renegotiation stage and the
operator can grasp some second-period rent by doing so.
Our modeling strategy of having an almostrational principal who updates his beliefs
only from the rough information contained in the decision to take or not the xed-price
contracts in the rst period avoids those unpalatable dilemmas. It allows our model to
keep all the avor of the dynamic rent-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ familiar from the theoretical
literature on renegotiation without rendering the analysis untractable in our context with
a continuum of types. It also satises our desire of making the theoretical model as close
as possible to the existing data set and this certainly requires some concessions on the
theory side.
In the sequel, we will focus on proles of subsidies that come unchanged through the
renegotiation process. We thus mimic the earlier theoretical literature on renegotiation
and adopt the following denition of a renegotiation-proof long-term contract.
Denition 1 A prole (b1; b2) of subsidies is renegotiation-proof if o¤ering ~b2 = b2 is
found optimal by the principal at date 1.25.
The theoretical literature on renegotiation has shown that focusing on renegotiation-
proof mechanisms is without loss of generality.22 The intuition is as follows. Any long-term
contract which is renegotiated in the second period of the relationship could be replaced
22Hart and Tirole (1988), Dewatripont (1989), and La¤ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 10). In a model
with a discrete number of types for the privately informed agent, Bester and Strausz (2001, 2007) showed
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by a long-term contract with a second-period contract equal to this renegotiated o¤er.
This renegotiated o¤er is not itself superseded by any new o¤er for the second period
because, if it was so, this would contradict the optimality of the renegotiated o¤er in the
rst place. Our focus on renegotiation-proof proles follows the same logic and is without
loss of generality. For any given second-period subsidy b2, there exists an optimal second
period subsidy ~b2  b2 which maximizes the principals expected payo¤ for the second
period conditionally on what he has learned from seeing or not the rst-period acceptance
of the prole (b1; b2), i.e., that the rms innate cost is below some threshold 

1. Of course,
this threshold is itself determined by the perspective of having a renegotiated o¤er ~b2 in
the second period. By the very principle of optimality, if the prole (b1;~b2) had been
o¤ered in the rst place, there would be no scope for improving the principals payo¤ at
date 2.
Remark 4 The whole theoretical literature on renegotiation focuses on cases where pri-
vate information is modeled as being drawn from distribution with discrete supports.
Working in a model with a continuum of types as we do here is important for two reasons.
First, it claries the pattern of information revelation, i.e., how types with intermediate
e¢ ciency parameters end up adopting xed-price contracts in the second period and how
the corresponding subsidies increase over time. Second, it is also necessary to take into
account the signicant heterogeneity in the rms realized costs that comes from our data
set. As we show below, a model with a continuum of types provides a nice division of
the space of types into three intervals whose respective probabilities (obtained from the
equilibrium behavior of cut-o¤ types that dene those intervals) can be matched with the
empirical distribution of behaviors observed on our data. Models with discrete types could
allow a more detailed analysis of the pattern of information revelation23 and are thus at-
tractive from a theoretical viewpoint. However, such models are not consistent with our
data set. As we argued above, mass points in the distribution of realized costs are not
found in our data.
Renegotiation-proof proles: To be accepted, a renegotiated o¤er ~b2 has to increase
the rms information rent with respect to what it would get with the initial contract.
more generally that there is no loss of generality in looking for the optimal contract in the set of mech-
anisms having as much options as the set of possible types. A weak version of the Revelation Principle
applies but one has to be cautious and take into account that information is gradually revealed over time
so that mixed strategies in information revelation are possible.
23By means of the branching processes along the lines of Hart and Tirole (1988) for instance.
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Otherwise a rm that already chose the prole of xed-price contracts in the rst pe-
riod would still have the option of keeping the subsidy b2 for the second period. Any
renegotiated o¤er ~b2 must therefore raise subsidies:
~b2  b2: (2)
Solving the game backwards, we rst consider how the principal updates his beliefs
and makes a new o¤er at the renegotiation stage given the rst-period cut-o¤ strategy
followed by the rm. Two cases should be distinguished depending on whether the rm
has already accepted to work on a prole of xed-price contracts (  1) or not (  1).
Case 1: Renegotiation following good news,  2 1 = [; 1]. Following the
rst-period acceptance of the prole (b1; b2), the principal is led to think that the rm
is rather e¢ cient. Updated beliefs are easily obtained from Bayesrule using the cut-o¤
strategy of the agent. The updated density is f()
F (1)
for  2 1 = [; 1].
A renegotiated o¤er ~b2 is accepted in the second period when   2 where
2 = ~b2 + k: (3)
The new renegotiated o¤er ~b2 maximizes the principals expected welfare for the second
period where expectations are taken with those updated beliefs. We immediately nd:
Lemma 1 Assume that all types  2 1 = [; 1] accept the prole (b1; b2). A second-
period o¤er b2 is part of renegotiation-proof prole (b1; b2) following acceptance of that
prole when
b2  bF : (4)
Intuitively, a second-period subsidy can only be renegotiation-proof when it is greater
than under full commitment. Starting from the full commitment level, the principal nds
it more costly to marginally increase subsidies and the information rent of all inframarginal
rms than to enjoy the e¢ ciency gains withdrawn from such an increase for the marginal
type and types close-by.
Case 2: Renegotiation following bad news,  2 c1 = [1; ]. The rst-period
refusal of the prole (b1; b2) is interpreted by the principal as coming from the least e¢ cient
rms. The updated density function is now f()
1 F (1) for  2 
C
1 .
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A renegotiated o¤er is accepted by a rm with type  when (2) holds and   2 where
2 = ~b2 + k  1:
Lemma 2 Assume that all types  2 1 = [; 1] accept the prole (b1; b2). A second-
period o¤er b2 is part of a renegotiation-proof prole following rst-period refusal of that
prole when
kf(b2 + k) 

1  
1 + 

(F (b2 + k)  F (1))  0: (5)
Condition (5) expresses the fact that raising the subsidy for those rms which have
revealed themselves as being rather ine¢ cient in the rst period by refusing the long-
term prole (b1; b2) is not an attractive strategy for the principal. The e¢ ciency gains
(1 + )kf(b2 + k)db obtained when increasing the subsidy b2 by an amount db (so that
the marginal type who is indi¤erent between the cost-plus and the xed-price contracts
moves up) should be less than the net cost of raising the rent of all types that were not
under a xed-price contract before and now nd that option attractive. That costs is
worth (1 +   ) (F (b2 + k)  F (1)) db.
Taken altogether, the constant subsidy prole b1 = b2 = bF and the cut-o¤ rule
1 = b
F + k found under full commitment never satisfy (5). The optimal long-term
contract under full commitment and the corresponding pattern of information revelation
are not renegotiation-proof. Intuitively, upon learning that the rm is rather ine¢ cient
after an initial refusal of subsidies, the principal wants to slightly raise the second-period
subsidy to increase e¢ ciency. Clearly, a rm with a type close to (but below) 1 = b
F + k
refuses the rst-period subsidy because it gives little rent. It prefers to take a rst-period
cost-plus contract and waits for the increase in the second-period subsidy which comes
out of the renegotiation.
Turning now to the rms strategy, the cut-o¤ type 1 must be indi¤erent between
choosing the prole (b1; b2) at date 0.5 so that it reveals its type earlier on, and taking a
rst-period cost-plus contract plus the renegotiated o¤er b2 at date 1.5.:
b1 + (1  )b2 + k   1 = (1  )(b2 + k   1), 1 = b1 + k: (6)
We can summarize the pattern of information revelation as follows:
 Types  2 1 = [; 1] choose the prole (b1; b2).
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 Types  2 2=1 = [1; 2] choose only the subsidy b2 in the second-period. Those
types move thus over time from a cost-plus to a xed-price contract.
 Types  2 [2; ] choose cost-plus contracts for both periods.
That pattern summarizes incentive compatibility constraints but also how information
is gradually revealed in this dynamic context. For instance, if the cut-o¤ type 1 is just
indi¤erent between adopting subsidies in both periods or only at period 2, more e¢ cient
types   1 certainly prefer taking subsidies earlier on. Those types reveal right away
they belong to the interval 1. In the second period, new information is revealed as types
in 2 adopt the renegotiated o¤er.
Inserting (6) into (5) yields the more compact expression of the renegotiation-proofness
constraint:
 kf(b2 + k) +

1  
1 + 

(F (b2 + k)  F (b1 + k))  0: (7)
As a direct consequence of (7), we also immediately get
Proposition 2 Any renegotiation-proof prole (b1; b2) entails subsidies which are strictly
increasing over time:
b1 < b2:
Optimal renegotiation-proof proles: The optimal renegotiation-proof prole of
subsidies maximizes the principals intertemporal welfare subject to the renegotiation-
proofness constraints (4) and (7). It turns out that (4) is slack at the optimum, i.e,
renegotiation following good news" is not a concern. Intuitively, to avoid renegotiating a
xed-price contract that has been refused, the principal is forced to commit to a subsidy
above the full commitment outcome. Such subsidy is not renegotiated either if the rm
accepts it already in the rst period.
Denoting by  the non-negative multiplier of (7), assuming that the corresponding
Lagrangean is concave, and optimizing yields the following characterization of the optimal
renegotiation-proof contract.
Proposition 3 The optimal renegotiation-proof prole (bR1 ; b
R
2 ) entails a pattern of strictly
increasing subsidies such that:
bR1 < b
R
2 with b
R
1 < b
F (8)
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where
k   
(1 + )

1  
1 + 

=

1  
1 + 

R(bR1 + k); (9)
k +

(1  )(1 + )

1  
1 + 

  k
(1  )(1 + )
f 0(bR2 + k)
f(bR2 + k)
=

1  
1 + 

R(bR2 + k);
(10)
and
 kf(bR2 + k) +

1  
1 + 

(F (bR2 + k)  F (bR1 + k)) = 0: (11)
These equations form the structural system that we will then estimate in our empirical
study.
4 Empirical Model
Section 4.1 presents our data and the di¤erent variables that enter the estimation proce-
dure. This procedure is presented in Section 4.2. Results follow in Section 4.3.
4.1 Data
We discuss rst the construction of the di¤erent variables which enter the estimation pro-
cedure. Second, we explain how we organize our dataset for the estimation. In particular,
we dene precisely what a contractual period is, and which networks are selected under
each contractual scenario.
Construction of the variables: Table 2 presents statistics on the di¤erent variables
available in our data set. To understand how contracts are designed by public authori-
ties and how operators choose those contracts, we gather observations on subsidies and
operating costs. Costs are not directly used as an estimation device but are useful when
putting the estimated ine¢ ciency of the operators into perspective and deriving the e¤ort
levels. Information on subsidies is required to recover the distribution of the e¢ ciency
parameter. Total costs include wages and charges related to fuel consumption. Subsidies
entail all payments to the operator, either at the beginning of the production process
which are needed to reimburse expected costs (in the case of xed-price regimes), as
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well as payments to the operator at the end of the contracting period to guarantee full
reimbursement of total operating costs (in the case of cost-plus regimes).
Recall that our theoretical model makes the accounting simplication that commercial
revenues are kept by the public authority and that costs are reimbursed to the operator.
In our data, however, observed subsidies are the di¤erences between expected or nal costs
and commercial revenues. To make our data coincide with the model, we add commercial
revenues to the observed subsidy. Finally, we distinguish between nominal and real terms.
Costs and subsidies are deated using consumer price indexes (all items) for France. Only
real costs and subsidies are used during the estimation process.
Operatorscharacteristics include the size of the network, the number of lines operated,
the size of the rolling stock, the share of the labor bill in total costs, the share of drivers
in the total labor force, and the identity of the industrial group owning the operator.
We thus assume that some rms are more likely to perform e¢ ciently than others due
to intrinsic advantages of larger stakes, size, managerial practices and concentration of
skills.
The size of the network is the total length of the network measured in kilometers.
The number of lines operated in each network as well as the total size of the rolling stock
measured in the number of vehicles are also constructed. The share of the wage bill in total
costs is computed by dividing the wage bill by total costs. The total labor force includes
bus drivers as well as engineers who are keys to improve the operators productivity. The
share of engineers is simply obtained by dividing the number of engineers in each network
by the total labor force. Finally, the four important corporations who might own the
local operator are Keolis, Transdev, Agir, and Connex. We construct a dummy variable
for each of these corporations.
Institutional variables describing the public authority comprise the number of cities
involved in organizing the service, the size of the population of the total urban area where
the service is provided, and the political color of the local regulator. As explained at
the beginning of our text, the urban network may include several municipalities. We
observe the number of cities that form each urban area as well as the total population
of these areas. We also construct a dummy variable that takes value one if the local
government is right-wing, and zero when it is left-wing. Data on the political color of
the local government are published by the French national newspaper Le Figaro. Note
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that, over the period of investigation, local governments may belong to one of the main
political groups, ranked according to their position on the political line from extreme right
to extreme left (Extreme Right, Right, Center Right, Left, and Extreme Left).24
Denition of a contractual period and network selection: Our raw data set in-
cludes 49 networks observed over the 1987-2001 period. This corresponds to 138 con-
tracts. As a contractual period lasts on average for 5 years, we typically observe series of
3 contracts per network over 1987-2001. Very few cases entail networks where 1, 2, or 4
contracts are observed.
The selection of the relevant sample required for the estimation depends on the nature
of the contractual arrangement that is considered:25
Full commitment: Contractual arrangements entail series of contracts which are, in
principle, identical as shown in our theoretical study. When evaluating the distribution of
; we consider all the contracts of our data set (results in Table 3). To estimate Proposition
1, we consider only the 80 xed-price contracts of our sample (results in Table 4).
Renegotiation-proof : We restrict our attention here to networks where a newly elected
principal contracts for two periods with an operator. This results in a rst sample of 66
contracts that is used to compute the distribution of  (results in Table 5). Then, to
estimate the parameters of interest in Proposition 3, we restrict this last sample to series
of xed-price contracts only. This yields a nal sample of 26 contracts (results in Table
6).
24A public authority (principal) has its members coming from municipal councils, who are elected by
direct universal su¤rage for a renewable six-year term. The mayor is elected by the municipal council.
25Note that one contract in one network should in principle correspond to a unique observation in our
theoretical model, i.e., the contract items should remain constant over the - say - 5 years of a contract
period. The data reality may be slightly di¤erent. In practice, the data set shows that over a single
contract period, many items may be a¤ected by small uctuations. This may for instance be the case of
the operators supply measured by the number of seat-kilometers available, which, in turns, makes the
costs and subsidy levels uctuate too. These uctuations follow from exogenous shocks that may a¤ect
the activity of the operator over the contract length and are assumed to be iid in our model: changes
in tra¢ c conditions, changes in network conguration, road constructions which may cut a service route
over a certain period, strikes are all such examples. The economic responses to these predictable shocks
are written in the contract. Hence, although the contract items may uctuate over the contract period,
they constitute the objectives of the same contract. Instead of calculating a simple average value of
each item over the contractual period when uctuations are present, we choose to treat each di¤erent
uctuation as a separate observation so that the number of degrees of freedom of our study is increased.
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4.2 Full versus Limited Commitment
We have suggested above that the French urban transportation industry shows several
features making it a good candidate for illustrating renegotiation-proof proles of subsi-
dies. In particular, subsidies increase over time. The renegotiation-proof scenario is our
positive representation of reality while full commitment is our hypothetical scenario that
will be tested against our positive model.
A renegotiation-proof scenario corresponds to the following possibilities.
 A series of two xed-price contracts over two contracting periods denoted by (FF ).
From the theoretical model, the operator is then rather e¢ cient (  1).
 A cost-plus contract followed by a xed-price contracts (CF herein). The operator
is then only mildly e¢ cient (1    2).
 A series of two cost-plus contracts (CC herein). The operator is then rather ine¢ -
cient (  2).
A full-commitment scenario corresponds instead to the following possibilities.
 A series (F ) of xed-price contracts when the operator is rather e¢ cient (  F ).
 A series (C) of cost-plus contracts when the operator is rather ine¢ cient (  F ).
Full commitment. We start with the hypothetical and simpler case of full commitment.
This corresponds to the subsidy bF dened in equation (1). The parameters k, , and 
are unknown to the econometrician and need to be estimated, while bF is observed only
when a xed-price contract is taken. For the purpose of the estimation, we rewrite this
equation as follows:
ki =

1  i
1 + 

R
 
bFi + ki

; i = 1; ::; N , (12)
where i denotes network i, and N is the total number of networks in the sample.
The social value of e¤ort k, as well as the weight , are allowed to vary across networks.
These parameters might depend on a set of explanatory variablesXi which account for the
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characteristics of the operator, and a set of explanatory variables Zi which characterize
the local authority:
ki = k (Xi; !) ; (13)
and
i =  (Zi; ) ; (14)
where ! and  are two vectors of parameters to be estimated.
These explanatory variables will be discussed in more details when the results of
the estimation are presented. Note that we cannot identify separately the weight  on
the operators prot and the cost of public funds  since only the ratio 
1+
matters in
dening the optimal subsidy from (1). We will assume several possible values for , which
are consistent with the cost of an administration operating in a developed country.26
Note that the monotone hazard rate R () in (12) is also a priori unknown to us.
It needs to be identied to compute our estimation. Assuming a specic distribution
for F (), we can write the probability of observing a xed-price contract as follows: If
an operator does not accept a xed-price contract, it must be because  is too high.
By matching the distribution of  to an empirical probability of accepting a xed-price
contract, we can recover the parameters of that distribution. Assume that the s are
independent draws across networks from the same normal distribution with mean pc and
variance pc, the probability of accepting a xed-price contract is the probability of i
being less than bFi + ki, namely:
Pr
 
i  bFi + ki

= F
 
bFi + ki; pc; pc

; (15)
where F (; pc; pc) is the cumulative distribution function for that normal distribution
(with density f (; pc; pc)).
We estimate the system made of equations (12) and (15). As these two equations are
sequential, we can present their estimation procedure separately for ease of exposition. To
rst recover the values of pc, pc, and bki, we write the likelihood Li (pc; pc) of observing
a specic contract in network i at period t as:
Li (pc; pc) = F
 
bFi + ki; pc; pc
   
1  F  bFi + ki; pc; pc1   ; (16)
26For instance, Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) provided estimates (namely, 1.17 to 1.56) of the
welfare loss due to a one-percent increase in all distortionary tax rates. In the case of Canadian commodity
taxes, Campbell (1975) found that this distortion is equal to 1.24. More generally, it seems that the
distortion falls in the range of 1.15 to 1.40 in countries with an e¢ cient tax collection system.
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where   is a dummy that takes value one if the observed contract is a xed-price, and
zero otherwise. Assuming that observations are independent across networks, then the log-
likelihood function for our sample is just the sum of all individual log-likelihood functions.
L (pc; pc) = 
N
i=1Li (pc; pc) : (17)
With the estimates bpc, bpc, and bki in hands, we can calculate the distribution F (:;bpc; bpc),
as well as the monotone hazard rate R (:;bpc; bpc). Once this is done, we appraise bi in
(12). Rewriting equation (12) as:
G
 
bFi ; ki; i; ; pc; pc; "i

= 0; (18)
where "i is a two-sided error term, we can obtain maximum likelihood estimates bi.
Renegotiation-proof contracts. We turn now to the case of limited commitment. As
stated in Proposition 3, the optimal renegotiation-proof prole entails increasing subsidies
(bR1 ; b
R
2 ) which satisfy the system of equations (9) to (11). Our goal is to estimate these
equations together with the distribution of . In this system, the parameters that are
unknown to us and need to be recovered are k, , , , , as well as rp and rp, the
mean and the standard error respectively of the s normal distribution. We observe the
two variables bR1 and b
R
2 , the rst and second period subsidy levels respectively. As under
full commitment, those parameters might vary across networks. Hence, we rewrite the
system (9) to (11) as:
ki   i
i (1 + )

1  i
1 + 

=

1  i
1 + 

R
 
bR1;i + ki

; (19)
ki+
i
(1  i) (1 + )

1  i
1 + 

  i ki
(1  i) (1 + )
f 0
 
bR2;i + ki

f
 
bR2;i + ki
 = 1  i
1 + 

R
 
bR2;i + ki

;
(20)
 ki f
 
bR2;i + ki

+

1  i
1 + 
 
F
 
bR2;i + ki
  F  bR1;i + ki = 0; i = 1; ::; N: (21)
We assume again that the social value of e¤ort k, as well as the weight  given by the
regulator to the operators utility, are allowed to vary across networks. We expect these
parameters to depend on the same sets of explanatory variables Xi and Zi:
ki = k (Xi; ') ; (22)
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and
i =  (Zi; ) ; (23)
where ' and  are two vectors of parameters to be estimated. As under full commitment,
we will assume several possible values for .
To estimate the above system, we proceed as follows. First equations (19) and (20)
can be solved for i and i
i = 
 
bR1;i; b
R
2;i; ki; i; ; rp; rp

; (24)
i = 
 
bR1;i; b
R
2;i; ki; i; ; rp; rp

; (25)
while (21) is rewritten as
J
 
bR1;i; b
R
2;i; ki; i; ; rp; rp; i

= 0; (26)
where i is an error term.
The estimates bi are obtained from (21). Moreover, the estimates brp, brp and bki are
derived from the estimation of s distribution, which is computed following the same
method than under full commitment. First, assuming a specic normal distribution for
F () in the monotone hazard rate R (), we can write the probability of observing a specic
contractual arrangement over two periods.
To recover the characteristics of the distribution of the s, we replicate the method-
ology implemented when assuming full commitment as above. However, three types of
contractual arrangements are now used (instead of two previously). If an operator does
not accept any xed-price contract (in any period), it must be because it has too large a
. Likewise, if the operator accepts a xed-price contract in both periods (resp. second
period only), it is e¢ cient enough (resp. mildly e¢ cient). By matching the theoretical
probabilities of each of those regimes with their empirical probabilities, we can recover
the distribution of .
The operator accepts a xed-price contract in both periods when i  1 = bR1;i + ki
so that the probability of accepting such xed-price contract is:
Pr
 
i  bR1;i + ki

= F
 
bR1;i + ki; rp; rp

; (27)
where F (; rp; rp) is the cumulative distribution function with density f (:; rp; rp).
We assume again that the s are independent draws from a normal distribution that is
common across networks.
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The operator goes from a cost-plus to a xed-price contract when 1  i  2 =
bR2;i + ki: The probability of such pattern is thus the probability of  being greater than
bR1;i + ki and less than b
R
2;i + ki:
Pr
 
bR1;i + ki  i  bR2;i + ki

= F
 
bR2;i + ki; rp; rp
  F  bR1;i + ki; rp; rp : (28)
Finally, the operator takes cost-plus contracts in both periods when 2 = b
R
2;i + ki  i:
The probability of accepting such arrangement is thus:
Pr
 
bR2;i + ki  i

= 1  F  bR2;i + ki; rp; rp : (29)
The likelihood of observing one specic contractual arrangement in network i over
period t can thus be written as:
Li (rp; rp) =
F
 
bR1;i + ki; rp; rp
  
F
 
bR2;i + ki; rp; rp
  F  bR1;i + ki; rp; rp  1  F  bR2;i + ki; rp; rp ;
(30)
where f;;g are three dummies taking value one if the observed contractual arrange-
ment is of type fFF;CF;CCg respectively, and zero otherwise.
Since observations are independent, the likelihood function for our sample is just the
product of all individual log-likelihood functions:
L
 
rp; rp

= Ni=1Li (rp; rp) :
Once estimates brp, brp, and bki are obtained, bi is derived from (26), and bi and bi are
evaluated from (24) and (25).
4.3 Estimation Results
We now present the results of our estimation for both regulatory scenarios: the hypo-
thetical case of full commitment, and the renegotiation-proof prole which we believe ts
the French urban transport industry better. In both cases, results are presented in two
steps: First, we discuss the set of results associated to the estimation of s distribution,
F (). This sheds light on which factors a¤ect signicantly the social value of e¤ort k: In
a second step, we focus on the regulatory arrangements induced by Propositions 1 and 3,
and discuss our results on the estimated weight  on the rms prot in the authoritys
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objective, the intertemporal weight  from one contractual period to another, and the
multiplier  of the renegotiation-proofness constraint.
Full commitment: To estimate F (), we need to determine which variables X a¤ect
the social value of e¤ort k. Explanatory variables are related to the characteristics of
the operator, i.e., its skills and managerial ability, as well as its e¤ort technology. These
variables are a constant, a trend, the total size of the service network in kilometers, the
number of lines operated, the size of the rolling stock in number of vehicles, the share
of the labor bill in total costs, the percentage of engineers in the total labor force, a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the operator belongs to the corporation Keolis and 0
otherwise, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the operator belongs to the corporation
Agir and 0 otherwise, and a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the operator belongs to
the corporation Connex and 0 otherwise.
Results are presented in Table 3. In the course of the estimation, we realized that
the patterns which explain the social value of e¤ort highly di¤er from one network to
another, i.e., we could not obtain unique signicant e¤ects for all operators. Hence, we
allow estimation results to vary from one group to another. We present three di¤erent
estimations.
In (I), k depends on four dummy variables which account for the identity of the group
the operator belongs to (Connex is the reference group). Only Trandev has a signicant
and positive e¤ect on k, suggesting that an operator belonging to Transdev seems to
guarantee a higher social return on managerial e¤ort compared to operators from any
other group.27
In (II), the explanatory variables are a constant for each group and the size of the
network interacted with each one of the group dummy variables. The results show that
the size of the network signicantly and positively a¤ects the social value of e¤ort in
networks where Agir and Transdev operate. This is probably an illustration of the fact
that economies of scale in e¤ort technology are greater for larger networks.
In (III), the explanatory variables are a constant for each group and the share of
engineers interacted with each one of the group dummy variables. The share of engineers
27The social value of e¤ort is inversely related to the technological cost of e¤ort, which implies that
Transdev also enjoys a less costly e¤ort technology. It would be interesting to relate these ndings to the
internal structure of managerial incentives within the operator but we did not have access to any related
information.
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provides a measure for the endowment of skills embodied in the rm. Engineers are
generally responsible for research and development, quality control, maintenance, and
e¢ ciency. Their action is particularly important to improve the average speed of the
network. We expect thus the share of engineers in the total labor force to positively a¤ect
the social value of e¤ort. Instead, the results suggest ambiguous e¤ects. If the operator
belongs to Transdev, the share of engineers has the expected e¤ect. If the operator belongs
to Agir, the e¤ect goes in the opposite direction.
Other variables such as the number of lines operated, the size of the rolling stock, or
the share of the labor bill in total costs have not provided signicant results. The four
estimation procedures yield very similar estimates of pc and pc, the mean and standard
deviation of s normal distribution respectively. Our results are strongly signicant, and
suggest that the average innate cost  is close to 22 millions Euros. By comparing this
value to the average (real) operating costs given in Table 1, we get an average e¤ort level
of around 5 millions Euros for the whole industry, which represents a 23% reduction of the
initial adverse selection parameter . This shows that managerial e¤ort is of signicant
value for that industry.
Once we have estimated pc, pc, and bki, we evaluate bi, the weight of the operators
prot in the public authoritys objective function. The explanatory variables which enter
Zi are a constant, the number of cities that form the local authority in charge of the
organization of the service, the size of the population of the relevant urban area, and the
political color of the local regulator. With the rst two variables, we want to test whether
the size of the city or a greater division of the network into distinct urban areas a¤ects
the bargaining power of the operator. We expect the latter to be more important in small
networks or networks made of many urban areas. With respect to the political color of
the local government, casual evidence suggests that a right-wing local government is more
eager to provide favors to private operators. bi should thus be higher with a right-wing
local government.
Results are presented in Table 4. The estimation of the average  are made under
the assumption that the local cost of public funds takes values  = f0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4g
respectively. Several comments are worth being made. First, the number of cities that
constitute the local authority and the size of the population were not signicant and have
been discarded. Second, whether the government is right-wing or not has a positive and
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very signicant impact on , conrming thereby our prior intuition. Third,  increases
with  but our initial restriction   1 +  holds always, even though it is not imposed
in the estimation.
Limited commitment. The estimation procedure is similar to the full commitment
case.
First, we need to estimate the distribution of , F (). Explanatory variables for k
are the sames as before. Three di¤erent estimations are also considered here, depending
on which group of explanatory variables is used: (I) Four dummy variables denoting the
identity of each group, (II) a constant plus the e¤ect of the network size for each group,
and (III) a constant plus the share of engineers for each group.28
The results are presented in Table 4. With respect to the estimation of k, several
comments are in order. First, as far as only dummy variables are concerned, Transdev is
the group with the highest social value of e¤ort. In (II), the di¤erent groups seem to react
di¤erently to an increase in the size of the network. In (III), they also react di¤erently to
an increase in the share of engineers.29
Again, the three estimations yield very similar estimates of rp and rp, the mean and
standard deviation of s. Our results are strongly signicant and suggest that the average
 is close to 20 millions Euros whereas the average level of e¤ort for the whole industry
lies around 3 millions Euros. Cost-reducing activities represent thus a 15% reduction of
the initial adverse selection parameter . Thus, the renegotiation-proof scenario implies
more e¢ cient operators exerting lower levels of e¤ort on average.
With the estimated brp, brp, and bki in hands, we turn to the evaluation of bi, bi and bi.
Average values of these parameters are presented in Table 5. Again, we perform these es-
timations assuming that the local cost of public funds takes values  = f0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4g :
Whether the government is right-wing or not has a positive and very signicant impact
on , but the estimated parameter in this case is much lower than 1 + . More gener-
ally, and comparing estimates of  across regimes, we observe that those estimates are
systematically higher under full commitment than under a renegotiation-proof scenario.
28The reader might remember that a major di¤erence is that now three regulatory arrangements are
considered instead of two as under full commitment.
29Note that the e¤ects go sometimes in an opposite direction than the ones obtained in the full com-
mitment case.
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Second, the average intertemporal weight  is equal to 0.53, suggesting that both rst
and second periods are perceived as equally important in the contractual arrangement.
Finally, the average multiplier ranges from 0.14 to 0.18.
The explanation for the di¤erence in estimates between the full commitment and the
renegotiation-proof scenarios is easily understood when coming back on the renegotiation-
proofness constraint (7). Remember rst that renegotiation is more of a concern when
the parameter 1   
1+
is greater, i.e., when the net social cost of the operators rent is
small enough so that the e¢ ciency gains from renegotiation outweigh the costs of giving
up extra information rents. By the same token, renegotiation is also more of a concern
when e¢ ciency gains are high, i.e., when k is greater. Considering a renegotiation-proof
scenario amounts thus to choosea higher value of this parameter. Looking at (7), a
higher estimate of k under a renegotiation-proof scenario than under full commitment
comes also with a higher estimate of 1   
1+
, i.e., a lower weight on the rms prot in
the renegotiation-proof scenario.
Our estimation results in Tables 2 and 4 go in the expected directions. First, note that
 is greater in the full commitment case than in the renegotiation-proof one. Second, k is
greater under renegotiation-proof than under full commitment. Estimated b! and b' allow
us to compute average bk under both situations. Full commitment entails average values
of bk equal to 0.13 (I), 0.18 (II), and 0.14 (III), while renegotiation-proofness entails values
equal to 0.17 (I), 0.51 (II), and 1.04 (III).
Lastly, as it can be seen from the right-hand side of the renegotiation-proofness con-
straint (7), renegotiation is more costly when increasing subsidies over time signicantly
shifts rents towards the operator which arises when types are on averagerather e¢ cient.
Neglecting that constraint biases the types distribution towards considering operators with
higher costs, which is conrmed by our estimations.
5 The Welfare Gains of Commitment
We assess now the magnitude of the welfare gains which can be obtained once one moves
from the renegotiation-proof setting to the less constrained full commitment scenario. We
also evaluate how these gains are distributed between private operators and taxpayers.
This is an important issue for practitioners since they have often complained on the
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insu¢ cient length of concession contracts in this sector.
Starting from our estimates of the various parameters of the model obtained from the
estimation of the renegotiation-proof scenario, we can reconstruct estimates of the average
social cost of subsidies and the average rent left to operators under both scenarios.30 We
proceed as follows.31
 Step 1. Using our set of renegotiation-proof estimates R =
bR; bR;bkR; bR; bR con-
ditional on  and its expression from the maximand in renegotiation-proof program PR,
we compute expected welfare levels WRi for each network of our data set. As emphasized
throughout this section, the renegotiation-proof arrangements correspond to the actual
contractual practices implemented in the French urban transport industry. Hence, the es-
timates R provide the econometrician with some information on the true characteristics
of the operator and the public authority.
 Step 2. We simulate the hypothetical subsidy level bbFi that would be paid under
full commitment. To do so, we solve (1) with respect to bbFi , using the real networks
characteristics R.
 Step 3. We reconstruct the hypothetical welfare measures W^ Fi for each network of our
data set, as predicted by our full commitment solution, and using our estimates bbFi and
R.
We compute the total welfare gains as well as the gains for taxpayers and operators
from commitment by considering an average network of the data set, using estimates R
conditional on  = 0:3 and ki specied as in (II) in Table 5.32
The estimates reported in Table 7 shed light on several interesting results. Of course,
commitment always improves welfare, compared to the situation where renegotiation puts
further constraints on contracting. There is no surprise there, and the important question
is not whether one gains by committing but how those gains are distributed. Second, it
turns out that bbFi > bRi bRi;1 + (1   bRi )bRi;2, i.e., switching from renegotiation-proof to full
commitment entails a higher intertemporal subsidy. In fact, the intertemporal payment
30Remember that our theoretical model has normalized the value of the service at some xed level S
so that consumersgross surplus does not change when considering di¤erent regimes. This variable will
thus be omitted in our analysis.
31See the Appendix for details.
32Note that the nal welfare results do not vary in a signicant manner if other values of  or ki are
chosen.
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to the operator increases, on average, by 27.3 %. Hence, taxpayers lose from an increase
in the commitment period of concession contracts, even though it is not a major loss in
expected terms as suggested by the small increase in tax burden (+3.8%).
Turning now to operators, our estimates show that their intertemporal rent increases
when moving to full commitment by 12,2%: This is a signicant gain that explains why
operators are so eager to extend the length of the concession contract in this sector.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a principal-agent model under limited commitment that features the
main characteristics of contracts and institutional practices in the French urban trans-
portation sector. On top of estimating key parameters of the economic and political
landscape in this sector, this model has allowed us to evaluate the cost of renegotia-
tion and how welfare gains would be redistributed by increasing contract duration and
improving commitment.
In this conclusion, we would like to make a few remarks and suggest a few alleys
for further investigation. First, we have deliberately restrained the general feature of
theoretical models of limited commitment in order to be able to bring the lessons of those
models to the data. Computing the optimal renegotiation-proof contract with a continuum
of types (already a rst-magnitude theoretical challenge) in the perspective of estimating it
econometrically would be a very messy and painful project. Taking data and institutional
constraints seriously forced us instead to focus on the case of simple two-item menus
which, although suboptimal, allows us to bring the extra benets of tractability when
it comes to a dynamic analysis. This applied theoryprocedure seems to us extremely
promising in areas like dynamic contract theory where pure theoryis either producing
untractable models or would make progresses at the cost of imposing heroic assumptions
on the underlying type distribution (assuming typically discrete types), assumptions that
would be hardly corroborated by data. Our approach could certainly be fruitful also for
other industries and contractual environments.
Second, even though our estimates show that welfare gains of commitment are sig-
nicant, we are certainly underestimating these gains here. Indeed, we have no ideas
on how renegotiation weakens the operators incentives to make any relationship-specic
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investment in this sector except through informal talks with practitioners in the eld. In-
troducing those considerations would even further push for an increase in contract length
that could secure investments and avoid hold-up e¤ects.
Third, a more complete analysis of the renegotiation process should incorporate the
possibility that public authorities build reputations for being tough on renegotiation. In-
deed, such reputation would be benecial in relaxing renegotiation-proofness constraints.
In other words, an omitted variable of our analysis is the amount of reputational capital
available to the contracting parties. That capital may be much easier to build in political
contexts where public authorities are likely to be reelected in the future and still in charge
with regulating the service in later periods. Our theoretical model has put aside those
reputation issues and has thus analyzed a worst scenario under renegotiation. More
research both on the theory side and also in building data sets which could account for
that reputational capital is certainly called for.
Fourth, our estimation has highlighted a few systematic di¤erences between opera-
tors of di¤erent companies in their abilities to generate social value through managerial
e¤orts. It would be worth linking those di¤erent abilities to the internal organizations,
the management practices and incentive structures of those rms. But again, we have no
information on this issue at this stage.
Lastly, our estimate of the cost distribution allows us to ascertain whether the restric-
tion to simple menus is relevant or not even in the static context. Echoing the theoretical
works of Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2007), we could now ask whether
the simple two-item menu fares well compared with more complete menus of contracts
given the estimated distributions. In this respect, our conjecture based on casual inves-
tigations with practitioners is that, yes, simple menus perform well and the gains from
more complex design within each period is unlikely of being of the same magnitude as the
welfare gains from improved commitment. Overall, our conjecture is that major sources of
contractual benets come more from better institutional design than from more complex
contractual engineering.
We hope to investigate some of those issues in future research.
38
References
[1] Bagnoli, C. and T. Bergstrom, (2005), Log-Concave Probability and its Applica-
tions,Economic Theory, 26: 445-469.
[2] Bajari, P., and S. Tadelis, (2001), Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory
of Procurement Contracts,Rand Journal of Economics, 32: 387-407.
[3] Ballard, C., J. Shoven and J. Whalley, (1985), General Equilibrium Computations
of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States,American Economic
Review, 75: 128-138.
[4] Baron, D., (1988), Regulation and Legislative Choice,Rand Journal of Economics,
19: 467-477.
[5] Baron, D. and D. Besanko, (1984), Regulation and Information in a Continuing
Relationship,Information Economics and Policy, 1: 267-302.
[6] Baron, D. and R. Myerson, (1982), Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,
Econometrica, 50: 911-930.
[7] Bester, H. and R. Strausz, (2001), Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and
the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case,Econometrica 69: 1077-1098.
[8] Bester, H. and R. Strausz, (2007), Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and
Noisy Communication,Journal of Economic Theory, 136: 236-259.
[9] Bower, A., (1993), Procurement Policy and Contracting E¢ ciency, International
Economic Review, 34: 873-901.
[10] Brocas, I., K. Chan and I. Perrigne, (2006), Regulation under Asymmetric Infor-
mation in Water Utilities,American Economic Review, 96: 62-66.
[11] Caillaud, B., R. Guesnerie and P. Rey, (1992), Noisy Observation in Adverse Selec-
tion Models,Review of Economic Studies, 59: 595-615.
[12] Campbell, H., (1975), Deadweight Loss and Commodity Taxation in Canada,
Canadian Journal of Economics, 8: 441-446.
39
[13] Chiappori, P.A., and B. Salanié, (2000), Testing for Asymmetric Information in
Insurance Markets,Journal of Political Economy, 108: 56-78.
[14] Chu, L. and D. Sappington, (2007), Simple Cost-Sharing Contracts, American
Economic Review, 97: 419-428.
[15] Dewatripont, D., (1989), Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The
Case of Optimal Labor Contracts,The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104: 589-
619.
[16] Dionne, G. and N. Doherty, (1994), Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renego-
tiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets, Journal of Political
Economy, 102: 210-235.
[17] Faure-Grimaud, A. and D. Martimort, (2003), Regulatory Inertia,Rand Journal
of Economics, 34: 413-437.
[18] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, (1990), Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency
Contracts,Econometrica, 58: 1279-1319.
[19] Gagnepain, P. and M. Ivaldi, (2002), Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of
Public Transit Systems in France,RAND Journal of Economics, 33: 605-629.
[20] Gagnepain, P., M. Ivaldi and D. Martimort, (2009), Complex Menus of Contracts
versus Simple Ones: What are the Welfare Gains,mimeo.
[21] Gasmi, F., J.J. La¤ont and W. Sharkey, (1999), Empirical Evaluation of Regu-
latory Regimes in Local Telecommunications Markets, Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 8: 61-93.
[22] Guesnerie, R., X. Freixas and J. Tirole, (1985), Planning under Incomplete Infor-
mation and the Ratchet E¤ect,Review of Economic Studies, 52: 173-191.
[23] Hausman, J. and J. Poterba, (1987), Household Behavior and the Tax Reform Act
of 1986,Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1: 101-119.
[24] Hart, O. and J. Tirole, (1988), Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics,
Review of Economic Studies, 55: 509-540.
40
[25] Institut dEconomie Industrielle, (1999), Network Industries and Public Service,
European Commission Reports and Studies, 4.
[26] Kalt, J.P., and M.A. Zupan, (1984), Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory
of Politics,American Economic Review, 74: 279-300.
[27] Kalt, J.P., and M.A. Zupan, (1990), The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legisla-
tors: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions,Journal of Law and
Economics, 33: 103-132.
[28] La¤ont, J.J., (1996), Industrial Policy and Politics, International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization, 14: 1-27.
[29] La¤ont, J.J. and D. Martimort, (2002), The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-
Agent Model, Princeton University Press.
[30] La¤ont, J.J. and J. Tirole, (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Reg-
ulation, MIT Press.
[31] Melumad, N., D. Mookherjee and S. Reichelstein, (1992), A Theory of Responsabil-
ity Centers,Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15: 445-484.
[32] Mookherjee, D. and S. Reichelstein, (2001), Incentives and Coordination in Hierar-
chies,Advances in Theoretical Economics, vol1-iss1-art4.
[33] Oum, T.H., Waters II, W.G., and J.S. Yong, (1992), Concepts of Price Elastic-
ity of Transport Demand and Recent Empirical Estimates, Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy, 26, 139-154.
[34] Perrigne, I, and Q. Vuong, (2007), Nonparametric Identication of Incentive Regu-
lation Models,Working paper Pennsylvania State University.
[35] Reichelstein, S., (1992), Constructing Incentive Schemes for Government Contracts:
An Application of Agency Theory,Accounting Review, 67: 712-731.
[36] Rey, P. and B. Salanié, (1990), Long-Term, Short-Term and Renegotiation: On the
Value of Commitment in Contracting,Econometrica, 58: 597-619.
[37] Rogerson, W., (1987), On the Optimality of Linear Contracts,Mimeo Northwest-
ern University.
41
[38] Rogerson, W., (2003), Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and
Regulation,American Economic Review, 93: 919-926.
[39] Schmalensee, R., (1989), Good Regulatory Regimes,Rand Journal of Economics,
20: 417-436.
[40] Williamson, O., (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press.
[41] Wilson, R., (1993), Nonlinear Pricing, Oxford University Press.
[42] Wolak, F.A., (1994), An Econometric Analysis of the Asymmetric Information
Regulator-Utility Interaction,Annales dEconomie et de Statistiques, 34: 13-69.
Appendix
 Proof of Proposition 1: Under full commitment, the principals problem can be
rewritten as:
(PF ) : max
(b1;b2)
W F (b1; b2)
The monotone hazard rate property ensures quasi-concavity of this objective.33 The cor-
responding rst-order conditions yield nally the characterization of the optimal subsidy
in (1).
 Proof of Lemma 1: The optimal subsidy b^2 should thus solve the following problem
at the renegotiation stage:
(PR2 ) : max
~b2
W2G(~b2) subject to (2).
where the second-period welfare following good newsis given by
W2G(~b2) = S   (1 + )
 
~b2
F (~b2 + k)
F (1)
+
Z 1
~b2+k
f()
F (1)
d
!
+ 
Z ~b2+k

~b2 + k   
F (1)
f()d
Di¤erentiating the above maximand with respect to ~b2 yields
W 02G(~b2) = (1 + )kf(~b2 + k)  (1 +   )F (~b2 + k):
The maximum of the principals expected welfare is thus achieved for b^2 = b2 as requested
by the renegotiation-proofness constraint (2) when b2  bF .
33See for instance Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
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 Proof of Lemma 2: The optimal subsidy b^2 that can be o¤ered at the renegotiation
stage solves now the principals second period welfare when evaluated with the updated
beliefs following bad news(i.e., the decision to stick to a cost-plus contract in the rst
period):
(PR2 ) : max
~b2
W2B(~b2) subject to (2)
where
W2B(~b2) = S (1+)
0@~b2

F (~b2 + k)  F (1)

1  F (1)
+
Z 
~b2+k
f()d
1  F (1)
1A+ Z ~b2+k
1
(~b2+k ) f()d
1  F (1)
:
Di¤erentiating the above maximand with respect to ~b2 yields
W 02B(~b2) = (1 + )kf(~b2 + k)  (1 +   )(F (~b2 + k)  F (1)):
The maximum of the principals expected welfare is thus achieved for b^2 = b2 as requested
by the renegotiation-proofness constraint (2) when (5) holds.
 Proof of Proposition 2: Since  < 1 +  and the density function is positive, (7)
implies: F (b2 + k)  F (b1 + k) > 0, i.e., b1 < b2.
 Proof of Proposition 3: The optimal renegotiation-proof subsidies maximize the
principals intertemporal welfare subject to the renegotiation-proofness constraints (4)
and (7).
(PR) : max
(b1;b2)
WR(b1; b2) subject to (4) and (7)
where
WR(b1; b2) = S   (1 + )(b1F (b1 + k) + (1  )b2F (b2 + k))
 (1 + )
 

Z 
b1+k
f()d + (1  )
Z 
b2+k
f()d
!
+


Z b1+k

(b1 + k   )f()d + (1  )
Z b2+k

(b2 + k   )f()d

:
Because  > 0,  < 1+ and R() is increasing, (9) immediately implies that bR1 < bF .
Proposition 2 implies then bR1 < b
R
2 .
 Welfare Estimates: Using our estimates from the case where renegotiation-proof
contracts are considered, we get the following expression of welfare in network i:
WRi = S   TRi + bRi URi ; (31)
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where
TRi = (1 + )(
bRi bRi;1F (bRi;1 + bkRi ) + (1  bRi )bRi;2F (bRi;2 + bkRi ))
+(1 + )
 bRi Z 
bRi;1+
bkRi f()d + (1 
bRi )Z 
bRi;2+
bkRi f()d
!
;
and
URi =
bRi Z bRi;1+bkRi

(bRi;1 +
bkRi   )f()d + (1  bRi )Z bRi;2+bkRi

(bRi;2 +
bkRi   )f()d:
Likewise, from our full commitment program (PF ), we dene welfare as the weighted
sum of surplus S, expected taxes T Fi and operators expected rent U
F
i weighted by the
corresponding weight bRi :
W Fi = S   T Fi + bRi UFi ; (32)
where
T Fi = (1 + )
 bbFi F bbFi + bkRi + Z bbFi +bkRi f()d
!
;
and
UFi =
Z bbFi +bkRi

(bbFi + bkRi   )f()d:
Note that the gross surplus S vanishes at the moment of calculating the di¤erence be-
tween both welfare measures WCRi and WC
F
i : Hence, we evaluate the welfare di¤erential
between both renegotiation-proof and perfect commitment situations as
Wi = W
F
i  WRi : (33)
Similar denitions follow for T Fi and Ui.
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Name Quantity
Period of observation 1987-2001
Number of networks 49
Changes of operators 2
Changes of local governments 22
Number of contracts 136
Fixed-price contracts 75
New contracts 94
Switch contract type 20
Switch Cost-plus to Fixed-price 17
Table 1: Contracts
Graph 1: Subsidy per Unit of Supply
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Variables Mean Stand. Dev.
Nominal Cost (Euros) 20,549,568 19,273,852
Nominal Subsidy (Euros) 20,702,141 19,239,199
Including Revenue (Euros) 9,608,629 10,526,903
Subsidy per unit of supply (Euro) 0.016 0.005
Real Costs (Euros) 16,997,693 15,483,483
Real Subsidy (Euros) 18,760,150 17.395,482
Size of the network (km) 288.3 200.1
# of lines 23.6 13.2
# of vehicles 168.1 119.5
# of cities in the urban network 18.3 16.7
Size of population 236,799 177,641
Share of Labor in total costs 0.64 0.10
Share of engineers 0.29
Share right-wing government 0.52
Share Fixed Price contracts 0.55
Share Keolis 0.32
Share Agir 0.16
Share Connex 0.22
Share Transdev 0.24
Table 2: Data
46
Social value of e¤ort k
Variables I II III
Agir -0.08 -1.31 -4.42
(0.07) (0.46) (1.22)
Keolis 0.05 -0.09 -0.10
(0.06) (0.13) (0.27)
Transdev 0.52 0.26 2.09
(0.11) (0.18) (0.90)
Agirsize 5.07
(1.72)
Keolissize 0.52
(0.39)
Transdevsize 1.60
(0.83)
AgirEngineers -5.99
(1.65)
KeolisEngineers -0.21
(0.37)
TransdevEngineers 2.22
(1.20)
Mean  (10000) 0.22 0.23 0.22
(0.04) 0.06 (0.04)
Stand. Dev.  (10000) 0.47 0.51 0.48
(0.08) 0.16 (0.09)
# of Contracts 138
Table 3: Full Commitment: Ine¢ ciency distribution and social value of e¤ort
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right wing
 I II III
0.4 1.29 1.38 1.37
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
0.3 1.19 1.28 1.27
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
0.2 1.10 1.18 1.17
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
0.1 1.01 1.08 1.07
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
# of Contracts 80
Table 4: Full Commitment: Parameter of interest in Proposition 1
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Social value of e¤ort k
Variables I II III
Agir 0.02 -0.26 -2.19
(0.05) (0.12) (0.73)
Keolis 0.07 0.32 -0.08
(0.04) (0.08) (0.46)
Transdev 0.41 0.41 2.04
(0.07) (0.11) (0.80)
Agirsize 1.25
(0.49)
Keolissize -0.76
(0.21)
Transdevsize -0.06
(0.34)
AgirEngineers 3.05
(1.00)
KeolisEngineers 0.21
(0.63)
TransdevEngineers -2.27
(1.09)
Mean  (10000) 0.20 0.20 0.20
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Stand. Dev.  (10000) 0.22 0.21 0.22
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
# of Contracts 66
Table 5: Renegotiation-proof: Ine¢ ciency distribution and social value of e¤ort
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Parameter I II
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
right wing 0.61 0.67 0.73 0.78 0.64 0.70 0.76 0.82
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16)
 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
# of Contracts 26
Table 6: Renegotiation-proof: Parameters of interest in Proposition 2
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Welfare Items Total (in Million Euros)
Subsidy
- Full commitment (estimated) 21.7
- Renegotiation-proof 1 15.5
- Renegotiation-proof 2 18.9
Di¤erential 1 +6.2
Di¤erential 2 +2.9
Social cost
- Renegotiation-proof 23.8
- Full commitment 24.7
Di¤erential +0.9
Rent operator
- Renegotiation-proof 21.2
- Full commitment 23.8
Di¤erential +2.6
Total welfare
- Renegotiation-proof -0.35
- Full commitment 1.65
Di¤erential +2.0
# of Contracts 26
Table 7: Welfare di¤erentials for the average network
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